Ukraine Doesn’t Need to Win, It Just Can’t Lose – The “Thousand Cuts” Winning Strategy for Kyiv

There is a huge difference between Kyiv’s and Moscow’s strategic goals: on one hand, Zelensky is trying to survive, which means that Ukraine can’t lose. On the other hand, for Putin, after almost half a million Russian casualties, more than 20,000 pieces of military hardware destroyed, damaged, or captured, hundreds of billions of dollars spent, and the image of the formidable Russian military badly stained around the world, he needs to do more than just “not lose.” He can’t just give up…he HAS to WIN!

This difference in reality for Russia and Ukraine is something that Kyiv and its Western supporters can exploit. They can do so by not trying to defeat Russia outright—such as by taking Ukrainian territory back—but by bleeding the Russian bear through a “thousand cuts” until it dies a slow and painful death.

Death by a thousand cuts is not a new military strategy or tactic. It has been used often throughout history in asymmetric wars, where the weaker side doesn’t bother trying to defeat its stronger enemy directly. Instead, it relies on asymmetric warfare tactics, such as ambushes, cyber warfare, probing assaults, and long-range drones, to constantly attack its stronger adversary and ultimately undermine its morale, resources, and will to fight until it gives up.

In recent history we can see this particular strategy play out in three different conflicts.

The first is the Vietnam War. In the 60s and 70s, the Vietcong and North Vietnamese army were not superior to the American military and its allies. However, they kept pressure on the US military and the South Vietnamese military until the financial, political, human, and social costs were too much for the US to bear.

Eventually, this led to the US pulling out of Vietnam  as the communists prevailed.

In this case, the North Vietnamese didn’t completely defeat the American military. Hanoi didn’t invade the US homeland, capture Washington DC, New York, or Los Angeles, and establish the “Vietnam of America.” Rather, they bled the US physically and financially until the Americans had to give up. (That said, it’s important to note that North Vietnam had extensive financial and military support from both China and the USSR at this time.)

We saw something similar happen with both the Russians and the Americans in Afghanistan. In the 70s and 80s, the Mujahideen (Islamist resistance groups that fought against the Soviet Union) fought a war of resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. They didn’t “win” the war by our usual definition. But with the help of Uncle Sam, they did bled the Soviets enough that Moscow pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989.

To give a final example, we can look at the pullout of American troops from Afghanistan in 2021. The Taliban, with constant attacks on US forces, ambushes, IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), and other tactics over the course of 20 years, eventually made the war unsustainable for the Americans. Though the Taliban had little support from external allies, the financial, political, human, and social costs it caused the Americans outweighed the benefits of extending the American presence in the country. In other words, it was able to bleed the Americans through “a thousand cuts” almost single handedly.

I argue that Ukraine should do the same with Russia now. With financial and military support from the West, the Ukrainians should play a game of defense using probing attacks —but not necessarily large offensives—to bleed the Russians until the war becomes unaffordable for Putin both economically and politically.

I will explain the why and how below, along with the preconditions for this strategy to succeed.

NOTE: Please don’t get me wrong. I would very much prefer that the West would go all-in and support Ukraine in a way that would defeat Russia in a matter of months. However, I recognize that politically this is extremely difficult. So, I’m offering an alternative that is more politically palatable and that will hopefully lead to a Ukrainian victory by playing defense and a Russian defeat—and possibly the collapse of the Russian Federation at large.

Why should Ukraine go into defensive mode, drop most of its offensives, and let the Russians bleed themselves out?

To start, there are two primary reasons why Ukraine should go on the defensive and let the Russians destroy themselves until they have to give up.

• The first reason is that you lose far more soldiers and resources as an attacker than you do as a defender. On average, attackers usually suffer a 4:1 casualty ratio compared to defenders. However, if defenders are well dug-in with well-planned fire zones and plenty of artillery support, their casualties can still be drastically reduced from these already favorable numbers.

• The second reason is the prevalence of drones, long-range artillery, and mines. The extensive use of drones in the war in Ukraine has given a greater advantage to the defenders as it allows them to  survey a greater portion of the battlefield, even deep behind enemy lines. This makes the accumulation of hardware necessary for a battalion-level offensive almost impossible without being spotted well in advance.

From there, with long-range weapons, defensive forces can destroy any gathering force preparing for an offensive. For those vehicles and infantry that make it through the artillery and missile barrage, FPV (first-person view) drones will be waiting to pick them off. Finally, for the very fortunate—or unfortunate—survivors, well-placed anti-tank and anti-personnel mines will do the final trick.

The catastrophic failure of the Russian Vuhledar offensive (which eventually succeeded after huge Russian losses) illustrates this scenario. There, the Russians launched a traditional mechanized assault against well-organized Ukrainian defenses. The result was exactly as described above. The assault was halted by Ukrainian artillery, drones, and many, many mines. At the end of the day, it was a complete Russian failure, costing the size of a battalion in personnel and material.

Why should Ukraine avoid going on the offensive?

The overwhelming tactical superiority of defensive forces in the current Ukrainian conflict is already a great reason for playing defense against Russia. However, there are other specific reasons why Ukraine should focus on defense.

• Its F-16s are not enough to take over the sky: Even with the recent arrival of  F-16 fighter jets, Ukraine likely won’t be able to achieve complete air superiority in a theater full of Russian SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) and other air defense systems.
• Ukraine is already facing a manpower shortage in its military: Because of this, it can’t risk high-casualty assaults, which large-scale offensives would likely lead to. Yes, the Kursk offensive was a winning gamble against weak Russian defensive positions but will not turn the tide of the war now.
• Contrary to Russia, Ukraine cares about its soldiers: Historically, Russians have a very different mentality and value system compared to Ukrainians today, many of whom are increasingly aligning with Western values, particularly in how they value life. Many Russians, however, seem largely indifferent to the idea of throwing their compatriots into the “meat grinder” to die for a billionaire Tsar like Putin.
• Ukraine is running low on weapon stockpiles: Unfortunately, there is also no guarantee that the West would continue supplying enough weapons for a highly attritional offensive, which would require vast amounts of military hardware.
• There is a universal fear of escalation: There are concerns in the West that a very successful offensive against Russia might prompt Putin to use tactical nuclear weapons or encourage China to start openly supporting Moscow militarily. However, if Russia’s assaults continue to fail, both scenarios are less likely to come to pass as playing defense brings about a higher moral standing.
• Morally and strategically, Ukraine and Zelensky are already winning: At the beginning of the war, many (though not me) believed Kyiv would fall within three days. Yet here we are, nearly three years into the war, and Ukraine continues holding on, having recaptured more territory than it has lost. If Ukraine can avoid losing much more ground, it can politically and morally sustain this war longer. I will outline below the preconditions necessary for this defensive strategy to succeed.

Preconditions for the success of Ukraine’s defenses and the “thousand cuts” tactic

For Ukraine’s defensive tactic to work effectively, several preconditions must be in place:

• The West must maintain military and financial assistance to Ukraine no matter what: Even if Ukraine doesn’t launch a full-scale offensive, it will still need large quantities of shells, missiles, drones, air defense systems, and armored vehicles to build strong defensive lines.
• Western intelligence will continue to be crucial: With UAVs and satellites, the West must continue to provide intelligence to Ukraine to help to target Russian troop and hardware accumulations, as well as fuel and munitions depots deep inside Russia.
• Mines, mines, and more mines: Ukraine will need extensive minefields to make its frontlines impenetrable. Since Kyiv is unlikely to launch large offensives, these mines won’t hinder Ukrainian troops. If Russian forces retreat or there are particular offensive opportunities, well-documented mining maps can be used to clear paths.
• Russia must not achieve air superiority: Even before the arrival of F-16s in Ukraine, Russia has failed to gain complete air superiority over Ukraine. If they did, it would severely hamper Ukraine’s ability to defend against bombings and gunship helicopters. However, with the arrival of the F-16s, Kyiv may be able to ground most of Russia’s air force, leaving only Russia’s long-range missile and glide bomb attacks as significant threats.
• More air defenses are needed: Ukraine requires enough air defense systems to protect both military and civilian infrastructure from long-range missile strikes. By focusing less on offensive hardware and more on defensive weapons, Ukraine can allocate more resources to protecting the frontlines and the rest of the country.
• Ukraine will need small victories to maintain morale: These victories could come in the form of successful long-range missile strikes or surprise offensives, like the one launched in Kursk. Using its arsenal of long-range drones, Western-supplied ATACMS, Storm Shadow, SCALP, and hopefully the German Taurus (what are you waiting for, Olaf?) Ukraine can create havoc onRussian rear positions.
  Each destroyed Russian Black Sea Fleet ship, airbase, bomber, refinery, ammo depot, or even the Kerch Bridge will be a substantial victory that boosts Ukrainian troop morale and at the same time bleeds Russia economically and emotionally. Each Russian assault thwarted and asset destroyed is one of the thousand cuts that will lead to its ultimate demise —as long as Ukraine stays united and supported.
  As with the Kursk offensive, small, targeted, probing attacks by Ukraine will keep Russian forces on their toes, constantly guessing where, when, and if Ukraine will launch a full-scale offensive.
• Keep the fight going on multiple levels: Cyberwarfare, economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, information warfare, sabotage within Russia, and weakening the regime wherever possible are all forms of attack that act like poison, slowly killing the victim.
• China must not supply weapons to Russia: If China were to arm Russia, Moscow’s resources would become nearly limitless, pushing the world closer to a potential WWIII.
• Trump must not win the 2024 U.S. presidential election: Setting politics aside and focusing solely on the impact on the Ukrainian conflict, based on Trump’s past comments regarding Putin, Ukraine, NATO, and the transatlantic alliance, if he were to win the presidency, he would likely halt all support to Ukraine and cut a deal with Putin that “gives” a significant part of Ukraine to Russia. In this case, Russia would win the war and Ukraine would lose with drastic geopolitical consequences for Europe, the Indo-Pacific (including China and Taiwan), and America’s global standing, potentially ushering in a new era of dictatorship-led world order.
• North Korean troop deployment: As of publishing, South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea plans to send 12,000 troops to support Russia in Ukraine. Although this may not result in a strategic victory for Moscow, it will certainly make it harder for Ukraine and prolong the process of Russia’s defeat through a “thousand cuts” overall

What could a Ukrainian “victory” look like brought about by playing defense?

Russia’s “death by a thousand cuts” could manifest in several ways:

• The collapse of the Russian armed forces: After years of failing to gain significant territory and suffering millions of casualties for a war that poses no direct threat to the homeland, Russian soldiers could begin mutinying and defecting en masse, ultimately leading to the collapse of the Russian military. This wouldn’t be the first time something like this has happened.  During WWI, Russian forces experienced multiple mutinies due to harsh conditions and high casualties. In WWII, Russia managed to avoid defections on this same scale because that war was a battle for the survival of the motherland, which  is not the case with Ukraine.
• A coup against Putin: Putin’s hold on power relies on projecting strength. If he spends years in Ukraine without achieving significant victories while bleeding Russia financially and militarily, his power could weaken. A weaker Putin could lead to a potential coup by generals, oligarchs, or ambitious politicians.
• A challenge for leadership: As mentioned previously, Putin cannot afford to stop his offensive. His entire war effort is based on the premise that parts of Ukraine rightfully belong to Russia. He needs to keep trying to capture territory. If he stops, it would be both a personal as well as a leadership failure that could open the door for a challenge to his authority in the Kremlin.
• A Russian-led ceasefire: If a coup or mutiny doesn’t occur, Putin might seek a ceasefire that favors Ukraine if the war becomes politically unsustainable for him.
• The exhaustion of Russian military hardware: Even if there’s no coup, mutiny, or ceasefire, after years of failed offensives, Russia could face the complete exhaustion of its personnel and equipment. At the moment, Russia is losing more military equipment than it can produce and is relying on its vast stockpiles of Soviet-era equipment. These reserves are likely to reach a “critical point of exhaustion” by the second half of next year. At that point, Ukraine may have a better chance of launching a successful offensive.
• A successful Ukrainian offensive in the distant future: In the meantime, Western countries can rebuild their military industries to supply Ukraine with the hardware and ammunition necessary to weaken Russia enough for a successful Ukrainian offensive, ultimately shifting the balance of power in favor of the defender.

Factors that could help further Ukraine’s goal of weakening Russia but which are not preconditions for success

• Deep strikes: Western nations could allow Ukraine to use their supplied weapons for strikes deep within Russian territory.
• NATO/EU boots on the ground: NATO trainers and advisors could be stationed in Ukraine so as to free up more Ukrainian troops for the frontlines. Though some might argue that this would lead to WWIII, during the Vietnam and Korean wars, there were thousands of Russian and Chinese “advisors” present without it sparking global armageddon.
• NATO air defenses: NATO could use its air defense systems from within its own territory to shoot down Russian missiles targeting Ukraine, particularly in the western parts of the country. This would free up Ukrainian air defense units to focus on frontline defense.
• Utilization of Russian money and frozen assets: A final option would be to take advantage of the interest from frozen Russian assets to support Kyiv financially and militarily. At the end of the day, more money is needed for Ukraine, whether through grants, loans, or defense bonds—the time for half-measures is over.

North Vietnam and the Vietcong did it. The Afghanis did it twice. If the preconditions above are met—each of which is realistic and attainable—there is no reason why Ukraine can’t use these same “death by a thousand cuts” tactics to defeat Russia by slowly bleeding it to death.

This is why Ukraine needs the West’s commitment to long-term, continuous support. They are fighting and dying not only to defend their homeland but also to safeguard our way of life and the future of the Global Liberal Order that has brought unprecedented prosperity to the world. The least the West can do is help Ukraine—and itself throughout this process —defeat Imperial Russia.